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Testamentary Formalism in Louisiana: Curing
Notarial Will Defects Through a Likelihood-of-Fraud
Analysis
INTRODUCTION
Before James Holbrook died, he thought that his last will and
testament was valid.1 The document that he prepared for probate
appeared to have all of the requisite formalities for a notarial will
required by Louisiana Civil Code article 1577.2 Unfortunately for
Mr. Holbrook’s potential legatees, the date recorded on the
attestation clause of the will included the year and the month, but
not the day—contrary to the strict requirements of Louisiana law.3
Although the will was properly dated on every other page, the
omission of the date on the attestation clause was due to the fault
of the notary who executed the document.4 Mr. Holbrook’s
daughter challenged the validity of the will on the basis of its lack
of form; she did not claim the existence of another will.5 Although
the document complied with the statutory formalities of a notarial
will in every other respect, a Louisiana circuit court declared his
will null for lack of form because of a seemingly minor flaw.6
Many people die leaving behind instruments that, although
intended to be wills, contain errors that deviate from the statutory
requirements. Much like the circuit court that decided Mr.
Copyright 2014, by GEORGE HOLMES.
1. See In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845, 848 (La. 2014).
2. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014):
The notarial testament shall be prepared in writing and dated and shall be
executed in the following manner. If the testator knows how to sign his
name and to read and is physically able to do both, then: (1) In the
presence of a notary and two competent witnesses, the testator shall
declare or signify to them that the instrument is his testament and shall
sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page.
(2) In the presence of the testator and each other, the notary and the
witnesses shall sign the following declaration, or one substantially
similar: “In our presence the testator has declared or signified that this
instrument is his testament and has signed it at the end and on each other
separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other we have
hereunto subscribed our names this ____ day of _________, ____.”
3. Holbrook, 144 So. 3d at 848.
4. Id. at 847–48.
5. Id. at 846–47.
6. Id. at 847. The purpose of this Comment is not to undermine the roles
that various will formalities serve in succession law. Instead, this Comment
presents Louisiana courts with the means to validate formally deficient wills in
cases where the testator was properly protected against fraud or undue influence
despite the defect. See infra Part IV.
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Holbrook’s case, courts across the United States have historically
regarded any deviation from the formal requirements of wills as
fatal to a will’s validity.7 One basis for these decisions is that will
formalities exist to provide unequivocal evidence of testamentary
intent.8 A conflict arises, however, when the testator’s intent is
evident despite the testator’s non-compliance with the formalities.
In such cases, wills are often invalidated notwithstanding the clear
intent of the testator to leave a will.9
Fortunately, the many inequities caused by strict adherence to
testamentary formalities have led to a reform in the law.10 Judges
and scholars criticized the traditional approach—known as strict
compliance—for prioritizing form over substance.11 As a result of
this criticism, state legislatures, scholars, and courts worked to
devise methods to protect testamentary intent without belittling the
importance of will formalities.12 Those who advocated for reform
offered two potential solutions: reduce the number of will
formalities13 or replace strict compliance with a more equitable
doctrine.14 Although reducing the number of formalities resulted in
some success, a conflict still remained as to how courts should
remedy the divide between testamentary intent and testamentary
7. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1975) (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and
relentless formalism. . . . The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to
void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was
inconsequential.”).
8. See generally id. at 492 (“When the court is asked to implement the
testator’s intention, he ‘will inevitably be dead’ and unable to authenticate or
clarify his declarations, which may have been made years, even decades past.
The formalities are designed to perform functions which will assure that his
estate really is distributed according to his intention.” (footnote omitted)).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See generally infra Part I.B (discussing the flaws of the strict
compliance doctrine and subsequent reform).
11. See generally infra Part I.B; see also Leigh A. Shipp, Comment,
Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming Wills: New Choices for Probate Courts
in the United States, 79 TUL. L. REV. 723, 729 (2005) (citing Stevens v.
Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 611 (W. Va. 1998)) (“The dissent criticized the
majority for ‘slavishly worshiping form over substance’ . . . .”).
12. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 218
(Supp. 2013).
13. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014). The notarial will is based on
the Louisiana statutory will, which was enacted in the 1950s to create a will
more simple in form. KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND
DONATIONS § 12:1, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 392 (2d ed. 2009).
14. See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341748, archived at http://perma.cc/EN9T-NA8Z.

2014]

COMMENT

513

formalities.15 Thus, scholars in the last quarter of the 20th century
attempted instead to formulate replacements for the strict
compliance doctrine: the substantial compliance doctrine and the
harmless error rule.16
As opposed to strict compliance, the substantial compliance
doctrine provides courts with a method to validate wills even if the
document deviates from the testamentary formalities required by
state law.17 Under substantial compliance, courts must analyze the
formally invalid will and determine if the purpose of the formal
requirement is adequately satisfied despite the defect.18 The
harmless error rule presents a simplified version of substantial
compliance: instead of performing a functional analysis, courts may
validate a formally defective will if the document reflects the intent
of the testator through clear and convincing evidence.19
Unfortunately, the results under both the substantial compliance
and harmless error doctrines have been underwhelming. Few courts
apply these doctrines as scholars envisioned, perhaps because the
doctrines, in some ways, present more complications than those
presented by strict compliance.20 The analyses required of courts in
applying the curative doctrines do not lend themselves to hard rules;
in theory, a court applying substantial compliance or harmless error
must do so on a contextual, case-by-case basis.21 As a result, courts
have struggled to understand and consistently apply these
doctrines.22
Nowhere has this failure been more pronounced than in
Louisiana, where the Louisiana Supreme Court purportedly
adopted the substantial compliance doctrine in Succession of
Guezuraga in 1987.23 In Guezuraga, the Court held that a formally
defective will is in substantial compliance with the statutory
requirements if the document adequately guards the testator against
15. See id. at 13–16.
16. Id.
17. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 513.
18. See generally id.
19. See Glover, supra note 14, at 14. Both the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Wills and Donative Transfers and the Uniform Probate Code adopted
the harmless error rule. Id.
20. See Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty
Years Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 600–02 (2007).
21. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 494.
22. On the failures of the substantial compliance doctrine and harmless
error rule, see infra Part I.C.2 and accompanying discussion.
23. See Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of
Wills: Some Guidance From the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1901–02 (1996);
Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987).
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fraud.24 Problematically, Louisiana courts have applied Guezuraga
inconsistently and with mixed results.25 One concern is that what
some Louisiana courts call substantial compliance is, in
application, more akin to a strict compliance standard;26 many of
these courts adhere to a rule that any deviation is fatal to the
validity of the will.27 Another issue is that some courts apply the
Guezuraga standard inconsistently with the analysis articulated by
the Louisiana Supreme Court.28 These approaches leave the
validity of the document, regardless of the evidence reflecting
testamentary intent, contingent on arbitrary decisions by each
court. Such violations of testamentary intent are precisely the types
of injustices that the remedial doctrines of substantial compliance
and harmless error were designed to prevent.29 Moreover, this
ambiguity in judicial approaches leads to conflicting decisions and
uncertainty in the law.30
Considering the unfeasibility of the historically recognized
curative doctrines, this Comment advocates for Louisiana courts to
continue to apply the doctrine propagated by Guezuraga, but
specifically to apply the standard as articulated. To properly
understand Guezuraga, it should be noted that the Louisiana
24. See Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368 (citing Loretta Garvey Whyte, Note,
Donations—Imperfect Compliance With the Formal Requirements of the
Statutory Will, 15 LOY. L. REV. 362, 371 (1969)).
Where the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with
fraud, ordinary common sense dictates that such departure should not
produce nullity. It was the intent of the legislature to reduce form to the
minimum necessary to prevent fraud. It is submitted that in keeping
with this intent, slight departures from form should be viewed in the
light of their probable cause. If they indicate an increased likelihood
that fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered
substantial and thus a cause to nullify the will. If not, they should be
disregarded. Thus testators and estate planners will have the security
that the legislature intended to give them.
Id.
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and
Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code
“Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism (pt. 1), 43 FLA.
L. REV. 167, 239 (1991).
27. See, e.g., id.
28. See, e.g., Succession of Songne, 664 So. 2d 556 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(illustrating the use of a jurisprudential and quantitative approach, rather than a
contextual one).
29. For a discussion of the remedial doctrines and their underlying
purposes, see infra Part I.C.
30. For an illustration of the inconsistent standards and results reached by
Louisiana circuit courts when analyzing formally defective wills, see infra Part
III.
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Supreme Court’s holding is not substantial compliance as
understood by legal scholars.31 In Guezuraga, the Court expressed a
completely unique doctrine that streamlines the analysis of
validating wills that are defective in form: taking all of the formal
shortcomings into consideration, if the document properly protects
the testator against fraud, the will should remain valid.32 Despite this
holding, Louisiana courts have still applied inequitable and
inconsistent standards in determining the validity of formally
deviant wills.33 To better enforce testamentary intent and provide
guidance to courts, practitioners, and Louisiana citizens, this
Comment argues that Louisiana courts should apply the Guezuraga
test as articulated—a court should validate a will unless there is a
likelihood of fraud or undue influence.34 Under this standard,
courts must determine on a case-by-case, contextual basis whether
the deviations in formality reflect the probability of fraud. This
doctrine would provide fairness to potential legatees, while
remaining faithful to testamentary intent. Moreover, a consistent
standard would provide a more simplified process for courts and
practitioners.
Accordingly, Part I of this Comment discusses the history of
testamentary formalism and the various remedial doctrines adopted
by courts in the United States. Part II outlines the history of will
formalities in Louisiana, focusing on the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decision in Succession of Guezuraga, which purported to
adopt the substantial compliance doctrine. Part III then analyzes
the Louisiana jurisprudence on substantial compliance and
demonstrates the lack of a coherent standard. Currently, Louisiana
courts inconsistently apply the applicable standards in examining
formally invalid wills. Results vary from case to case, creating and
perpetuating a lack of clarity for courts, practitioners, and testators
alike. Finally, Part IV advocates for Louisiana courts to return to
the Guezuraga rule. Moreover, this Part provides guidance as to
how the rule may be applied with more consistency. Under
Guezuraga, a testator’s intent will not be invalidated by de
31. See infra Part IV.A.
32. See Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368–69 (La. 1987).
33. On the inconsistent standards applied by Louisiana courts, see infra Part
III and accompanying discussion.
34. This Comment does not intend to apply to testaments that contain
defects that will, in nearly every circumstance, render the testament invalid. For
example, a will that is not signed by the testator will almost certainly be
invalidated under every circumstance. In theory, a major deviation in form is not
evidence of testamentary intent because the deviation leaves the testator
susceptible to fraud. This Comment instead addresses circumstances where the
testator remains protected against fraud despite the deviation.
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minimis errors, and courts are provided with a doctrine less subject
to confusion.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF WILL FORMALITIES
Most American wills statutes are based on two English
sources: the Statute of Frauds of 1677 and the Wills Act of 1837.35
The Statute of Frauds was remarkable because it—for the first
time—required most testaments conveying personal property to be
written.36 Prior to the statute’s enactment, such transfers could be
executed orally.37 Likewise, the Wills Act was very influential
because it merged the formal requirements for devising real and
personal property.38 Both statutes required some combination of
writing, signature, attestation, and the presence of witnesses.39
These formalities, for the most part, carried over into modern
American succession law.40
A. The Functions of Will Formalities
Scholars recognize four functions of testamentary formalities:
evidentiary, channeling, cautionary, and protective.41 The evidentiary
function reflects an understanding that statutory formalities will serve
as “probative safeguards,”42 meaning that compliance with the
required formalities serves as reliable evidence of testamentary
intent.43 For example, the requirement that witnesses be present at
the execution of the will provides courts with firsthand testimony of
the will’s authenticity should the validity of the will be challenged.44

35. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68
N.C. L. REV. 541, 547 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation
Requirement].
36. Id.
37. Id. at 547.
38. Id. at 548.
39. Id. at 550 tbl.1.
40. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 212
(Supp. 2013) (requiring that the testament must be in writing, executed or signed
in the presence of two witnesses, and signed by the testator and both witnesses);
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014) (requiring that the testament be executed in the
presence of a notary and two witnesses, in writing, and signed by the testator,
notary, and both witnesses).
41. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.
42. Langbein, supra note 7, at 492.
43. Id. at 492–93.
44. Glover, supra note 14, at 30.
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The channeling function allows for greater judicial efficiency
in the probate of wills.45 If all wills must meet a minimum
formality standard, courts thereby require little “imagination” in
determining what constitutes a valid will and what does not.46
Again using the example of the witness requirement, a witness
may provide unbiased testimony as to the legitimacy of the will
execution. Each witness can attest to any formality and whether it
was performed properly; without witness testimony, courts would
have to rely heavily on less reliable extrinsic evidence, thereby
slowing the judicial process.
The cautionary function impresses upon the testator the
seriousness of the act of executing a testament.47 Because the will
becomes operative only upon death, formalities “caution the
testator, and they show the court that he was cautioned.”48 The
cautionary function also reflects the ceremonial or ritualistic nature
of will execution.49 Requiring the presence of witnesses “sets the
execution of a will apart from ordinary transactions.”50 The gravity
of the execution ceremony gives the testator the opportunity to
consider what he wants to achieve by executing the will, especially
because the will is primarily a donative, and not onerous, act.51
The protective function ensures “that the contents and
execution of the will are the product of free choice of the testator,
free of fraud or undue influence.”52 Just as the formalities protect
the testator at the time of execution, that protection extends into
probate.53 The challenger to a will must overcome a difficult
presumption to prove that the “duly executed will does not
represent a genuine expression of testamentary intent.”54 The
advantages of having witnesses attend the execution are evident:
the presence of multiple witnesses protects the testator not only
from fraudulent third parties but also from a potentially fraudulent
witness.55

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.
Id.
Langbein, supra note 7, at 495.
Id.
Glover, supra note 14, at 23–24.
Id. at 25.
See id.
Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.
Glover, supra note 14, at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20–21.
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B. The Strict Compliance Doctrine
Although formalities serve useful functions, they create
problems in circumstances in which the intent of the testator is
evident but the will is formally deficient. The “cornerstone of the
law of wills” is that the testator should be given the freedom to
dispose of his property and that the law should protect the
“testator’s intent to exercise this freedom.”56 Will formalities thus
present a difficult question that courts and scholars struggle to
answer: how should a court balance the intent of the testator
against the functions of testamentary formalities? For centuries,
courts applied a standard of strict compliance,57 which dictates that
any deviation from the statutory requirements, no matter how
minor, renders the will invalid.58 The benefit of strict compliance is
that it encourages the testator to carefully comply with statutory
requirements.59 Moreover, a formally compliant document offers
strong evidence of testamentary intent and thus can be routinely
and efficiently processed by probate courts.60
However, the results of strict compliance can be harsh for the
potential beneficiaries of the will, especially if the document
accurately reflects the intent of the testator but contains a merely
technical flaw.61 Consider the Louisiana circuit court holding in In
re Succession of Holbrook, where the testator’s will was
invalidated by a circuit court for merely omitting the day of the
month on the testament’s attestation clause.62 Louisiana Civil Code
article 1577 requires that a notarial will contain a statement
similar, but not necessarily exact, to the following: “In our
presence the testator has declared or signified that this instrument
is his testament and has signed it at the end and on each other
separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other we
have hereunto subscribed our names this _______ day of
_________, _____.”63 The date the will was signed was
uncontested in the case.64
56. Id. at 9.
57. Shipp, supra note 11, at 728.
58. Langbein, supra note 7, at 489.
59. Id. at 494.
60. Id. See also Shipp, supra note 11, at 728 (“Conformity with statutory
requirements presumably serves as a reliable indicator of testamentary intent.”).
61. Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent:
The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34
CONN. L. REV. 453, 457 (2002).
62. In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845, 845 (La. 2014).
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014).
64. See Holbrook, 144 So. 3d at 847.
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A strict reading of the statute serves little purpose other than to
reflect a belief that compliance with the formalities is paramount to
testamentary intent. Thus, the doctrine can be inherently unfair for
would-be legatees. This unfairness is especially magnified under
the rules for Louisiana notarial wills, where fault is generally
attributed to a third party attorney or notary and not to the
testator.65 If “[t]he first principle of the law of wills is freedom of
testation,” strict compliance appears to foster a system that is
inconsistent with this principle.66
The doctrine has also proven to be less consistent in application
than originally perceived.67 Courts will often determine that
statutory requirements have been met in certain cases, even though
a strict interpretation of the statute might indicate otherwise.68 For
example, a Texas court in Nichols v. Rowan held a will to be valid
even though one of the witnesses testified that the witnesses’
signatures might not have been made in the presence of the
testator.69 The potential danger in validating such wills is that the
deviations detract from the functions of formalities. Requiring that
the signatures of the parties be made in the presence of each other
is designed to protect the testator against fraudulent acts.70
Furthermore, applying strict compliance in such a manner is
doctrinally dishonest because the premise of strict compliance is
that adherence to the formalities reflects testamentary intent;
anything short of that standard, according to the doctrine, is
65. See infra note 150 (illustrating that the role of the notary is more
ceremonial than practical). Louisiana does recognize a cause of action for
would-be legatees deprived of their potential shares of the decedent’s estate due
to the fault of an attorney or notary. See WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW §
15:27, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 374 (2d ed. 2009) (citing
Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. Ct. App. 1971)). Liability is based on
a stipulation pour autrui—or third party beneficiary—theory. See generally
Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973). A full discussion of
attorney or notary liability, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
66. Langbein, supra note 7, at 491. See also Miller, supra note 26, at 245
(“It could be argued that the rule of strict compliance is consistent with a system
which favors the state’s forced succession scheme, rather than a system which
favors the ‘individualistic institution’ of private property and the principle of
free testation.” (citations omitted)).
67. Sherwin, supra note 61, at 457. See also Langbein, supra note 7, at
525–26.
68. Sherwin, supra note 61, at 457 (citing Cunningham v. Cunningham, 83
N.W. 58, 60 (Minn. 1900); In re Pridgen’s Will, 107 S.E.2d 160, 163 (N.C.
1959); Nichols v. Rowan, 422 S.W.2d 21, 23–24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)). See
also Langbein, supra note 7, at 525 (“The rule of literal compliance can produce
results so harsh that sympathetic courts incline to squirm.”).
69. Nichols, 422 S.W.2d at 23–24.
70. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.
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inadequate.71 Courts may be implicitly recognizing the inequities
of strict compliance in these doctrinally suspect holdings.
C. Attempted Reforms of Testamentary Formalism and the
Continued Prevalence of the Strict Compliance Doctrine
Modern legal scholars criticize strict compliance of will
formalities on a number of grounds. Critics believe that the doctrine
“unnecessarily values the form of a will over the substance of the
testator’s intent”72 and argue that strict compliance is not the most
effective means of ensuring the evidentiary, channeling, cautionary,
and protective functions of testamentary formalities.73 If protecting
testamentary intent is the overarching goal, strict compliance falls
far short since a testator may still have intended for a formally
defective will to be valid. Accordingly, scholars have proposed two
methods of reform: the substantial compliance doctrine and the
harmless error rule.
1. Minimizing the Statutory Requirements for a Valid Will
The first method of reform was to simplify the statutory
requirements for valid wills.74 By reducing the number of
requirements to consider a will valid, it is less likely that the
testator’s intent will be invalidated for failing to conform to those
requirements.75 This approach was publicized on a national scale
through the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in
1969, which was adopted in some form by roughly 20 states.76
Nevertheless, even with fewer requirements, the UPC still required
strict compliance with the listed requirements, which somewhat
negated the effectiveness of the UPC’s reform.77 The movement
toward simplification was also evidenced by the transformation in
71. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 525–26 (“Many of the formalities have
produced a vast, contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case law
in which the courts purport to find literal compliance in cases which in fact
instance defective compliance. Is a wave of the testator’s hand a publication or
an acknowledgement? Was the signature ‘at the end’? When the attesting
witnesses were in the next room, were they in the testator’s presence? The courts
now purport to ask in these cases: did the particular conduct constitute literal
compliance with the formality?” (citations omitted)).
72. Glover, supra note 14, at 9.
73. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 525–26.
74. Glover, supra note 14, at 12.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV.
1009, 1011 (1992).
77. Glover, supra note 14, at 13.
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individual state laws; many states have decreased the number of
prescribed formalities in their statutory will requirements.78 In
Louisiana, the statutory—or notarial—will was enacted to
minimize the requisites for a valid will.79 However, although a
reduction in the statutory requirements makes drafting a will
simple for the testator, this method of reform still failed to provide
courts with a framework to validate formally deficient wills.
2. The Scholarly Attempt to Replace Strict Compliance with a
More Equitable Doctrine
The second method of reform, replacing strict compliance with
a more relaxed doctrine for analyzing formal deficiencies,
purported to provide courts with such a framework. As a result,
many American courts adopted two doctrines in place of strict
compliance: the substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless
error rule.80 Both substantial compliance and harmless error
provide courts with a process to validate wills otherwise
considered invalid under a strict compliance standard. However,
many states that have adopted these doctrines apply them
sparingly, thus failing to protect testamentary intent as initially
intended.81

78. Id.
79. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:2, at 409–10. To provide an example of an
overly complicated will, the former Louisiana nuncupative will by public act
required seven special formalities:
(1) the will must be dictated by the testator to the notary in the presence
of three witnesses residing in the place where the will is executed or of
five witnesses not residing in the place; (2) the will must be written by
the notary as it is dictated; (3) the will must then be read to the testator
in the presence of the witnesses; (4) there must be no interruptions or
turning aside to other acts; (5) the testament must be signed by the
testator or, if he cannot sign or does not know how to write, express
mention of this fact must be made in the will; (6) the testament must be
signed by the witnesses, or at least by one of them for all, if the others
cannot write; (7) express mention of the accomplishment of [the] forms
must be made in the testament.
LEONARD OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 103, in LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 185–86 (1973). See supra note 2 (discussing requirements
of Louisiana notarial will, which was created to simplify the statutorily required
will formalities); LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:4, at 427–28.
80. See Langbein, supra note 7; John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless
Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in
Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing
Harmless Errors].
81. See Lester, supra note 20, at 600–01.
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a. The Substantial Compliance Doctrine
In 1975, John Langbein authored Substantial Compliance with
the Wills Act,82 which quickly became the leading authoritative
source on the scholarly shift away from testamentary formalism
and strict compliance.83 Langbein recognized the conflict between
freedom of testation and the “stiff, formal requirements of the
Wills Act.”84 Unlike other donative transferors, the testator is
unavailable to affirm his intentions in court.85 Rather, the will is
the only evidence of the testator’s dying wishes. Thus, according to
Langbein, the formalities and their functions play a crucial role in
determining testamentary intent.86 However, at times, courts’
insistence on adherence to formalities undercuts testamentary
intent, especially in cases where it does not appear that the defect
has denigrated any of the functions of formalities.87
Langbein argued, therefore, that a defective will should be
found in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements if
it reflects “the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment
of the Wills Act purposes.”88 In other words, substantial
compliance “permits the proponents of a defective will to rebut the
traditionally irrebuttable presumption of invalidity arising from
defective execution by producing extrinsic evidence of the facts
and circumstances surrounding execution” sufficient to illustrate
satisfaction of the functions of will formalities.89 Langbein
believed that courts had proved “competent” in determining
whether a will adequately reflected testamentary intent and were
“accustomed” to analyzing whether the formality functions were
satisfied.90 He concluded that, “substantial compliance . . . merely
extends an established judicial technique.”91 However, despite
Langbein’s optimism, the substantial compliance doctrine gained
little popularity among American courts.92
82. Langbein, supra note 7.
83. Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate
Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1994).
84. Langbein, supra note 7, at 491–92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 501–02.
86. Id. at 492.
87. Id. at 498–99.
88. Id. at 513.
89. Miller, supra note 26, at 303 (citations omitted).
90. Langbein, supra note 7, at 516.
91. Id.
92. Bonfield, supra note 23, at 1900 (“At least in America, the widespread
adoption by courts of substantial compliance was not to be. In a number of
jurisdictions, courts prior to 1990 were invited to apply it, but it has been argued
that all courts which considered the Langbein brief ultimately declined.”).
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In its most basic form, substantial compliance allows a
formally defective will to be probated if the deviations are found to
be in substantial compliance with the functions of testamentary
formalities.93 Langbein posed the question that he believed courts
should ask: “[D]id the conduct serve the purpose of the
formality?”94 Put another way, taking the formal deviations and
available extrinsic evidence into consideration, did the document
still serve the four functions of will formalities to a satisfactory
level? However, this notion assumes that courts are familiar with
the functions of will formalities and can properly “evaluate their
relative significance” when resolving issues of testamentary
intent.95 Nevertheless, courts have failed to demonstrate this
familiarity and effectively wield substantial compliance. One
potential cause of the doctrine’s failure is the apparent gap between
the expectations of legal scholarship and the practicality of judicial
application of the substantial compliance doctrine.
Perhaps another reason for the failure of the doctrine is that
scholars provided little guidance to courts as to how the substantial
compliance doctrine should be applied. Twelve years after the
publication of Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act,
Langbein wrote that only one court had utilized the doctrine
appropriately.96 The case was Estate of Joseph Kajut, from the
Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania.97 The court held that
although the testator’s name had been typed on the will prior to
execution, rather than handwritten by the testator at the time of
execution, the will remained valid. The court conducted an
“exploration of the purposes” of will statutes and determined that
the intent of the testator was evident and that “no useful purpose”
would be served by invalidating the will “by a technical adherence
to the [statute].”98 The principal purpose of the will statute,
according to the court, “is to make certain that the intent of a
testator is effectuated.”99 Although Langbein praised this case, it is
worth noting that the case is strikingly lacking in the breadth of the
court’s analysis regarding the will’s validity.
Another possible explanation for the lack of popularity can be
found in the name of the doctrine itself.100 One scholar, C. Douglas
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
1981)).
98.
99.
100.

Lester, supra note 20, at 579–80.
Langbein, supra note 7, at 526.
Miller, supra note 26, at 304.
Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 80, at 8.
Id. (citing Estate of Joseph Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 123 (Pa. C.P.
Estate of Joseph Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 136.
Id.
Miller, supra note 26, at 306–08.
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Miller, argued that “‘[s]ubstantial compliance’ implies a
quantitative or yardstick standard of compliance which if not
achieved is not ‘substantial.’”101 According to Miller, courts
applied the doctrine using a quantitative analysis, analyzing the
“size” of each defect as opposed to analyzing the whole document
against the testamentary functions.102 In other words, some courts’
interpretation of substantial compliance is that the document
cannot substantially comply with the statutory formalities unless
the deviation is minimal.103 Like Langbein, Miller believed that
most courts purporting to use substantial compliance were using a
different analysis altogether.104 Miller suggested that “functional
compliance” would be a less misleading title to courts than
“substantial compliance.”105
Moreover, the substantial compliance doctrine, as applied, is
somewhat at odds with itself. The doctrine purports to protect the
formality functions of will execution, but does so at the expense of
one of those functions: channeling.106 Substantial compliance
inherently presents courts with a greater challenge in analyzing
formally invalid wills. The reasoning behind the channeling
function is that the presence of formalities provides courts with
clear evidence of testamentary intent such that they can rubber
stamp a will as valid or invalid simply by comparing the document
to the statutory requirements.107 By adopting a rule that not all
formalities must be followed strictly, the courts are left to make the
difficult determination of whether the functions have been
substantially satisfied.
This internal conflict additionally presents a circular problem.
Without court consistency in articulating minimum criteria, the
evidentiary value of the document diminishes as well. If the
probate of a will lacking in form is contingent upon a court’s
determination of compliance with the functions of formalities, then
the evidentiary function of those formalities is undermined. Thus,

101. Id. at 307.
102. Id. Miller’s hypothesis is derived from an analysis of Australian courts
and at least one court in the United States. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 308.
105. Id. at 307.
106. Langbein acknowledged that the success of the doctrine depended on
whether or not it would provide clarity to the law or further confuse the courts.
See Langbein, supra note 7, at 523–24. Langbein personally thought that
substantial compliance would apply overwhelmingly to handwritten wills
because they constituted the majority of wills executed without counsel. Id.
107. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725–26.
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the success of the doctrine remains somewhat contingent upon
whether its application is consistent.
b. The Harmless Error Rule
Langbein, perhaps out of frustration due to the lack of success
of the substantial compliance doctrine, modified his position in
1987.108 Langbein admitted the flaws of substantial compliance
and instead advocated for the second of the curative doctrines, a
“harmless error” rule.109 Like the substantial compliance doctrine,
harmless error is designed to be a purposive, non-technical
approach.110 However, instead of determining whether the
document complies with each of the functions of testamentary
formalism, the court must determine whether the document is an
accurate reflection of testamentary intent.111 Harmless error does
not require a quantitative analysis: “A judge using the harmless
error rule may examine both the noncomplying document as a
whole and the circumstances surrounding the document’s
execution.”112 Harmless error comes with a higher standard of
proof: the document must demonstrate through clear and
convincing evidence that the testator intended the document to be
his will.113 Also, unlike the judicially adopted doctrine of
substantial compliance, harmless error is generally promulgated
through legislation.114
Undoubtedly persuaded by Langbein and the success of the
doctrine in foreign jurisdictions, the drafters of the Uniform
Probate Code adopted the harmless error rule in their 1990
revisions.115 The UPC adopted Langbein’s definition almost
verbatim: a formally defective document will be treated as
statutorily compliant “if the proponent of the document establishes
108. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 80. Langbein admitted
the “snail’s pace of progress” of non-statutory substantial compliance in United
States courts. Id. at 8–9. Moreover, Langbein determined that substantial
compliance was a “flop” in application in Australian courts. In Langbein’s view,
the courts read “substantial” to mean “near perfect,” invalidating wills that
suffered from minor formal deviations. Id. at 1.
109. Id. Langbein adopted the doctrine from the South Australian
“dispensing power.” Id.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
3.3 cmt. b (1998).
111. Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement, supra note 35, at 568.
112. Lester, supra note 20, at 580.
113. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 80, at 53.
114. Id.
115. Shipp, supra note 11, at 727; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 editors’
cmt. (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 218 (Supp. 2013).
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with clear and convincing evidence” that the testator “intended the
document . . . to constitute” his will.116 Likewise, the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers endorses
the harmless error rule.117 The Restatement provides further
guidance on the application of the doctrine, explaining that each
error should be analyzed “in relation to the purpose of the statutory
formalities, not in relation to each individual statutory formality
scrutinized in isolation.”118 According to the comments to the
Restatement, analyzing the formalities in isolation would require a
“technical” and “non-purposive” analysis.119
Although harmless error is perhaps accepted more favorably
than substantial compliance, as evidenced by the Restatement and
the Uniform Probate Code’s adoption of the rule, only ten states
have enacted some form of the harmless error provision of the
Uniform Probate Code.120 Within these states, even fewer courts
have actually applied harmless error in cases involving facially
defective wills.121 The reasoning behind the doctrine’s failure
remains somewhat unclear. Perhaps, like substantial compliance,
intent is not a clearly defined concept, and both scholars and courts
have provided too little guidance on how the doctrine should be
appropriately applied. Even with the failure of the harmless error
doctrine, very few courts use substantial compliance in practice.122
By mostly rejecting the substantial compliance doctrine and the
harmless error rule, courts are perhaps implicitly recognizing the
116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 218 (Supp.
2013).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 (1998).
118. Id. § 3.3 cmt. b (1998).
119. Id.
120. Those states are: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana,
New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. Glover, supra note 14, at
15 n.105. See also In re Will of Palecki, 920 A.2d 413, 426–27 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(“In this regard, it is notable that New Jersey was hardly part of a state law
stampede when it recently revised its law to eliminate a strict signature
requirement. Although there has been scholarly support for changes of the kind
New Jersey made for some time and even though the UPC was itself amended in
1990 to provide for a harmless error provision analogous to that which New
Jersey later adopted, only a very few states have adopted that model rule.”
(citations omitted)).
121. Lester, supra note 20, at 600.
122. Id. at 602. Texas has adopted a narrow form of substantial compliance
by statute. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 251.101 (West 2014). Lester also
mentions one case from New Jersey, In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J.
1991), decided prior to the adoption of the harmless error rule in 2004 that is the
“most widely cited example of substantial compliance.” Lester, supra note 20, at
601.

2014]

COMMENT

527

necessity for a new approach to validating formally defective wills.
Thus, considering the current lack of acceptance of the curative
doctrines, “strict compliance clearly continues to dominate United
States policy.”123
II. LOUISIANA AND THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE
Louisiana courts have historically applied strict compliance
when analyzing formally defective wills.124 Over time, however,
both the Louisiana Legislature and Louisiana courts have recognized
the overwhelming support for adopting a relaxed approach towards
will formalities.125 The Legislature modernized the forms of
testaments by enacting the statutory will, a form of wills derived
from the common law with minimal formalities.126 The statutory
will evolved into the notarial will, which is currently described in
Civil Code article 1577.127 The movement away from stringent
formality reached its pinnacle when the Louisiana Supreme Court
decided Succession of Guezuraga, where the Court purported to
adopt the substantial compliance doctrine.128
A. The Evolution from Strict Compliance to Relaxation of
Formalities
In Louisiana, the traditional judicial understanding was that
even if a document evidenced testamentary intent, deviation from
the statutory formalities was fatal to the will.129 As it was in the
rest of the United States, this understanding was based on the
concept of strict compliance—that statutory formalities serve as
evidence of testamentary intent.130 In 1938, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held in Soileau v. Ortego that “the intention to make a will,
123. Lester, supra note 20, at 602.
124. See, e.g., Soileau v. Ortego, 180 So. 496, 497 (La. 1938).
125. The Legislature adopted the notarial will to simplify the formal
requirements for wills. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014). Additionally, the
Louisiana Supreme Court purported to adopt the substantial compliance
doctrine. See Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987).
126. See LORIO, supra note 13.
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 cmt. a (2014).
128. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368.
129. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 393–94. See also LA. CIV. CODE art.
1573 (2014) (“The formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must
be observed or the testament is absolutely null.”); OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, §
101, at 184–85 (“No matter how well the substantive provisions of the testament
effectuate his client’s wishes, if the attorney does not draft his testament
carefully and execute it correctly, his work will be in vain.”).
130. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 393–94.
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although clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the
execution thereof complies with the statutory requirements.”131
The Court further provided that the purpose of formalities is to
“guard against and prevent mistake, imposition, undue influence,
fraud, or deception, to afford means of determining . . .
authenticity, and to prevent the substitution of some other writing
in place thereof.”132 According to the Court, even if “there is no
fraud, or even [a] suggestion or imitation of it, [courts are not
justified] in departing from the statutory requirements, even to
bring about justice . . . since any material relaxation in the statutory
rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and
imposition.”133 Nevertheless, scholars also maintain that the
traditional “cardinal rule” when interpreting testaments in
Louisiana is to uphold the intent of the testator.134 Keeping this
cardinal rule in mind, “proof of non-compliance must be
‘particularly strong’ to overcome the presumption of validity
associated with testaments.”135
Modern Louisiana law reflects a shift away from testamentary
formalism in a manner similar to movements in the common law.
Like the revision of the Uniform Probate Code in 1969, Louisiana
took steps to simplify the will-making process.136 The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870 provided four forms of testaments:137 nuncupative by
public act,138 nuncupative by private act,139 mystic,140 and
131. Soileau v. Ortego, 180 So. 496, 497 (La. 1938).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 393.
135. Id. at 394.
136. On the various approaches of reform to curing invalid testaments, see
supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion.
137. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 392.
138. For a discussion of the requirements of the nuncupative will by public
act, see supra note 79.
139. “The nuncupative will by private act must be written either by the
testator or by another person from the testator’s dictation in the presence of five
witnesses who reside in the place where the will is made or of seven who reside
outside that place.” OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, § 105, at 191. Moreover, “the
testator must either read his will to the assembled witnesses or cause it to be
read to the witnesses in his presence.” Id. § 105, at 192. Then, the testator must
sign the will if capable. Id. § 105, at 192.
140. The requirements for the mystic will were as follows:
[T]he testator must sign his dispositions, whether he wrote them
himself or caused them to be written by another person at his direction.
The document must then be closed and sealed. The testator must then
present the will, closed and sealed, to the notary and three witnesses or
close it and seal it in their presence, and must declare to the notary, in
the presence of the witnesses, that the document contains his testament
written by himself or by another at his direction and is signed by him.
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olographic.141 In 1952, Louisiana adopted the statutory will directly
from common law sources to provide an “efficient, simpler
alternative” to the four separate forms of wills provided in the
Civil Code.142 Moreover, in the 1997 revision of successions law in
the Civil Code, all but two forms of testaments were discarded: the
olographic143 and the notarial wills.144
The notarial will, described in Civil Code article 1577, is a
codified version of the common law statutory will.145 However,
many of the formalities within the Code article itself derive from
the civil law.146 The article provides that the testament must be in
writing.147 Additionally, the testator must, in the presence of a
The notary must then draw up an act of superscription which must be
written on the document itself or upon the envelope which contains it and
the superscription must be signed by the testator, the notary, and the
witnesses. All the formalities must be performed without interruption or
turning aside to other acts. Since the testator must sign the will and the
superscription, those who do not know how to write or are not able to
write cannot make dispositions in the form of a mystic will. The act of
superscription must be signed by at least two of the witnesses and if any
of the witnesses cannot write, express mention of that fact must be made
in the act itself . . . [I]t is essential that the act of superscription recite that
all the formalities have been complied with or the will is null.
Id. § 107, at 195–96.
141. Article 1575 of the Louisiana Civil Code currently prescribes the
requirements for the olographic will:
An olographic testament is one entirely written, dated, and signed in the
handwriting of the testator. Although the date may appear anywhere in
the testament, the testator must sign the testament at the end of the
testament. If anything is written by the testator after his signature, the
testament shall not be invalid and such writing may be considered by the
court, in its discretion, as part of the testament. The olographic testament
is subject to no other requirement as to form. The date is sufficiently
indicated if the day, month, and year are reasonably ascertainable from
information in the testament, as clarified by extrinsic evidence, if
necessary.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575(A) (2014).
142. Id.
143. This Comment does not focus on the applicability of the curative
doctrines to the olographic will due to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s limitation
of Succession of Guezuraga to the notarial will. A discussion on the olographic
will is beyond the scope of this Comment.
144. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1576 (2014).
145. See LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:2, at 409–10; see also LA. CIV. CODE
art. 1577 cmt. a (2014) (explaining that the notarial will is equivalent to the
statutory will under former Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2442).
146. See RONALD J. SCALISE JR., Testamentary Formalities in the United States
of America, in COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW VOLUME 1: TESTAMENTARY
FORMALITIES 369 (Kenneth G. C. Reid et al. eds., 2011).
147. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014).
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notary and two witnesses, declare that the document is intended to
be his testament and sign his name at the end of the document and
on each page.148 Finally, the notary and the witnesses must sign
and date an attestation clause in the presence of the testator and
each other.149 The Louisiana notarial will is unique from other will
execution statutes in the United States in that it is the only statute
that requires the will to be notarized.150 Louisiana is also one of the
few states that requires the testator to sign each page of the will.151
B. Succession of Guezuraga
In 1987, the Louisiana Supreme Court established the current
formulation of the applicable doctrine of will formalities in
Succession of Guezuraga.152 Reasoning that the Louisiana
Legislature adopted the statutory will from the common law in order
to lessen the strict will formalities, the Court noted that it was “not
required to give the statutory will a strict interpretation.”153 The
Court further held that a will should be upheld “as long as it is in
substantial compliance with the statute.”154 Interestingly, the Court
remarked that when determining what constitutes substantial
compliance, courts should look to only one purpose of the formal
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See SCALISE JR., supra note 146, at 369 n.103. The lessened role of the
notary may also contribute to the shift from formalism in Louisiana as applied to
notarial wills. In other civil law jurisdictions, such as France, the notary is an
officer of the court and performs duties unique from those of an attorney. SAUL
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 12:15, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 296–97
(2d ed. 2001). In colonial Louisiana, the notary played a pronounced role
equivalent to that of other civilian jurisdictions. Id. § 12:15, at 297. However,
over time, the importance of the Louisiana notary diminished. The common law
equivalent of the notary, the attorney, now performs many of the notarial duties
in Louisiana. Id. Furthermore, even non-attorneys are capable of becoming
notaries. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35:191(A) (2006) (the requisites for
achieving notary status include a high school diploma and being mentally
sound). Thus, the requirement of the presence of the notary in article 1577
appears more ceremonial than practical.
151. See SCALISE JR., supra note 146, at 364 n.62.
152. 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987). The Louisiana Supreme Court used the
phrase “substantial compliance” prior to Guezuraga in Succession of Porche,
288 So. 2d 27, 29 (La. 1973) (“We agree with the intermediate court that the
present will substantially complies with the statutory formalities required and is
therefore valid.”). However, because Porche was decided prior to Langbein’s
article—which provides the clearest articulation of the doctrine—and because
Guezuraga provides the standard currently recognized by most Louisiana courts,
this Comment focuses on Guezuraga and its progeny.
153. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368.
154. Id.
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requirements: namely, “to guard against fraud.”155 In other words,
if the deviation from the will formalities does not expose the
testator to fraud, “ordinary common sense dictates that such
departure should not produce nullity.”156 Conversely, if the defect
“indicate[s] an increased likelihood that fraud may have been
perpetrated [the defect] would be considered substantial and thus a
cause to nullify the will.”157
The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed Guezuraga in 2014
in In re Succession of Holbrook.158 In Holbrook, the Court
overturned the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of the party challenging the will’s validity.159 The Court
held that it “need not strictly adhere to the formal requirements of
the statutory will, to the extent of elevating form over function.”160
Quoting Guezuraga, the Court confirmed that the underlying goal
is to “guard [the testator] against fraud” and that the proper
analysis is to determine whether the lack of formal compliance
“indicate[s] an increased likelihood that fraud may have been
perpetrated.”161
The Court’s approach in both Guezuraga and Holbrook is
significant in its uniqueness. Although the Court is correct in
stating that courts should look to the purposes of formality when
applying substantial compliance,162 avoidance of fraud is but one
of these functions.163 Therefore, the Louisiana approach represents
a truncated interpretation of substantial compliance. Regrettably,
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Loretta Garvey Whyte, Note, Donations—Imperfect
Compliance With the Formal Requirements of the Statutory Will, 15 LOY. L.
REV. 362, 371 (1969)). The Court’s entire analysis is as follows:
Where the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with
fraud, ordinary common sense dictates that such departure should not
produce nullity. It was the intent of the legislature to reduce form to the
minimum necessary to prevent fraud. It is submitted that in keeping
with this intent, slight departures from form should be viewed in the
light of their probable cause. If they indicate an increased likelihood
that fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered
substantial and thus a cause to nullify the will. If not, they should be
disregarded. Thus testators and estate planners will have the security
that the legislature intended to give them.
Id.
157. Id.
158. See In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).
159. Id. at 847.
160. Id. at 851.
161. Id.
162. See Lester, supra note 20, at 578–79.
163. The protective function is meant to ensure that the document is free
from fraud or undue influence. See Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.
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the resulting applications by Louisiana lower courts have been
extremely inconsistent.
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED BY
LOUISIANA COURTS
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court’s articulation of the
substantial compliance doctrine in Guezuraga, Louisiana circuit
courts have applied a wide variety of standards when analyzing the
formal validity of wills. Many courts follow Guezuraga to varying
degrees, whereas some courts apply a different standard altogether.164
Furthermore, the holdings of some cases indicate that, regardless of
the doctrine that courts purport to apply, strict compliance is the
actual standard employed.165 By relying strictly on rules created by
precedent or applying language like “material deviation,” the
implication is that courts are applying a quantitative standard and
disregarding contextual evidence of testamentary intent. 166
A. The Inconsistent Standards Applied by Louisiana Courts
When analyzing formally defective wills, some courts follow the
Guezuraga rule and analyze the statutory deviations against fraud in
order to determine whether the substantial compliance standard is
satisfied.167 The Second Circuit provided perhaps the best
articulation of the Guezuraga standard in Succession of Bilyeu.168
The court held that “when the instrument shows that the formalities
have been satisfied, technical deviations in the attestation clause
should not defeat the dispositive portions of an otherwise valid
will.”169 Consequently, “[i]f there exists an indication of the
increased likelihood of fraud, the variations would be considered
substantial and thus a cause to nullify a will. If not, they should be
disregarded.”170 Outside of Bilyeu, other courts merely cite the
164. See infra Part III.A.
165. See, e.g., In re Succession of Dunaway, 92 So. 3d 555, 557–58 (La. Ct.
App. 2012).
166. See, e.g., In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1188 (La. Ct.
App. 2013), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).
167. See, e.g., Successions of Eddy, 664 So. 2d 853, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(“A liberal construction of the statutory will law requires us to maintain the
validity of a will as long as it is in substantial compliance with the statute. In
deciding what constitutes substantial compliance, we must look to the purpose
of the formal requirements—to guard against fraud.” (citation omitted)).
168. Succession of Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. Ct. App. 1996). In Bilyeu,
the attestation clause referred to the male testator as “she” and “her.” Id. at 58.
169. Id. at 59.
170. Id. The court ultimately upheld the validity of the will. Id.
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language verbatim or nearly identical language from Guezuraga
instead of providing their own interpretation of the Guezuraga
doctrine.171
However, other courts claim to use substantial compliance—or
some other form of relaxed standard—without mentioning either
the formality functions or fraud.172 The result is some hybrid
standard between Guezuraga and strict compliance. In In re
Succession of Richardson, for example, the First Circuit provided a
discussion on the policy behind the statutory will similar to the
Guezuraga Court’s discussion.173 The court stated, in analyzing the
attestation clause requirement, “we will not require strict, technical,
and pedantic compliance in form or language.”174 The court
followed this seemingly relaxed standard by iterating that “all of the
formal requisites for confection of a notarial testament must be
observed, under penalty of nullity.”175 Such language is more
indicative of strict compliance. Ultimately, the court in Richardson
held that the defect was not in “substantial compliance” with the
statutory requirements.176 Nevertheless, the court failed to cite
language concerning protection of the testator against fraud when
considering the validity of the will.177
Additionally, many cases make no mention of Guezuraga or
substantial compliance at all and apply a standard more suggestive
of strict compliance.178 For example, the court in In re Hendricks
171. See, e.g., Succession of Hogan, 666 So. 2d 684, 685 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting Guezuraga directly); Succession of Squires, 640 So. 2d 813, 814–15
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Guezuraga directly).
172. See, e.g., In re Succession of Sampognaro, 865 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct.
App. 2004) (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court observed that in accordance with
the legislative intent, courts liberally construed and applied the statutory will
statute, maintaining the validity of a will if at all possible, as long as the will was
in substantial compliance with the statute.”); In re Succession of Richardson,
934 So. 2d 749, 750 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
173. Richardson, 934 So. 2d at 751. In Richardson, the will did not contain
an attestation clause. Id.
174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. The court held that the absence of the attestation clause was fatal
to the will’s validity. Id.
178. See In re Succession of Dunaway, 92 So. 3d 555, 557–58 (La. Ct. App.
2012) (“Moreover, although the intention of the testator as expressed in the
testament must govern, the intent to make a testament, although clearly stated or
proved, will be ineffectual unless the execution thereof complies with codal
requirements. A material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by
the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament. The formalities prescribed
for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely
null.” (citations omitted)); In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1188
(La. Ct. App. 2013) (“Moreover, although the intention of the testator as
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provided that a testament is “ineffectual unless the execution thereof
complies with the codal requirements.”179 The court further stated
that a “material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed
by the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament.”180 Not
surprisingly, other courts often cite similar language in cases where
the court chooses to invalidate the testament.181 What most of these
cases have in common is the lack of language regarding upholding
testamentary intent, a fundamental principle underlying Louisiana
succession law.
B. “Substantially Strict” Compliance
As a result, these patchwork analyses often force courts to
conduct the very types of quantitative analyses against which
Langbein advocated.182 For example, in Succession of Songne, the
testator included different years in the dates on different pages of
the document.183 Without citing any doctrinal standard such as
Guezuraga, the court in Songne merely cited to a rule, established
by precedent, that a will containing two different dates “is not
stricken with invalidity.”184 Applying this rule, the Songne court
upheld the validity of the will.185 The court accepted the testimony
of the notary and the witnesses not to determine the will’s validity
but to determine the correct date.186
Similarly, when In re Succession of Holbrook was before the
First Circuit, Mr. Holbrook’s widow attempted to use Songne as
dispositive precedent governing the challenge to her husband’s

expressed in the testament must govern, the intent to make a testament, although
clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the execution thereof
complies with codal requirements. A material deviation from the manner of
execution prescribed by the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament.”
(citations omitted)), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).
179. In re Hendricks, 28 So. 3d 1057, 1060 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., In re Succession of Wade, No. 2012-CA-0808, 2012 WL
6681706 (La. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012) (invalidating will because testator did not
sign the document); In re Succession of Seal, No. 2010-CA-0351, 2010 WL
3527597 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2010) (invalidating will because notary and
witnesses failed to sign an adequate attestation clause); Hendricks, 28 So. 3d at
1057 (invalidating will because testator failed to sign one of the dispositive
provisions of the will).
182. See Langbein, supra note 7.
183. See Succession of Songne, 664 So. 2d 556, 558 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 558–59
186. See id. at 558.
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will.187 After all, the differences were minor: in Songne, the years
on the document were different and in Mr. Holbrook’s will, the
day of the month was merely omitted from the attestation clause.188
The court also acknowledged that “the intention of the testator as
expressed in the testament must govern.”189 However, the First
Circuit found Mr. Holbrook’s will to be invalid.190 In making this
determination, the court cited language stating that a “material
deviation” from statutory formalities renders the will invalid.191
Similar to the Songne court’s reasoning, the First Circuit’s holding
was based almost exclusively on rules established by precedent;
not once did it mention substantial compliance or protecting the
testator from fraud.192 The court also distinguished the facts of the
case from Songne, even though the differences were relatively
insignificant.193 Moreover, the court neglected to consider the
testimony of the notary and one of the witnesses in support of the
will’s validity.194
Cases like Songne and Holbrook illustrate both the lack of a
coherent standard and the potentially inequitable results produced
by this doctrinal void. Although the Songne court upheld the will, a
blanket rule that all wills that contain two different dates should be
considered valid misconstrues the purpose of the curative
doctrines. Substantial compliance requires a functional analysis.195
Therefore, precedent should be mostly irrelevant because each
defect should be analyzed in light of the circumstances surrounding
the execution.196 In theory, the curative doctrines require a
187. In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1189 (La. Ct. App.
2013), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014). While the lower court’s holding was
overturned by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the lower court’s analysis is still
relevant. The Louisiana Supreme Court merely overturned the lower court’s
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the party opposing the will; the
case was not decided on its merits. Holbrook, 144 So. 3d at 845. Moreover, the
lower court’s analysis illustrates that some courts still prefer to use a stricter
compliance standard.
188. Holbrook, 115 So. 3d at 1185.
189. Id. at 1188.
190. Id. at 1189.
191. Id. at 1188.
192. Id. at 1185–90.
193. Id. at 1189.
194. Id.
195. For a discussion of the substantial compliance doctrine and its proper
analysis, see supra Part I.C.
196. See Miller, supra note 26, at 303–04 (“Langbein characterizes substantial
compliance as essentially a litigation doctrine that permits the proponents of a
defective will to rebut the traditionally irrebuttable presumption of invalidity
arising from defective execution by producing extrinsic evidence of the facts and
circumstances surrounding execution sufficient to prove testamentary intent by a
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contextual determination, considering both the testament and the
available extrinsic evidence, of whether the document adequately
serves the formality functions or represents an accurate reflection of
testamentary intent.197 Subscribing to precedential rules indicates
that the analysis is quantitative. In other words, courts believe that
certain defects always “substantially comply” with the will statute
and others do not.
Conversely, the lower court’s analysis in Holbrook bypasses
Guezuraga altogether, providing evidence that many courts prefer
utilizing stricter criteria when analyzing formally defective wills.
Such courts may implicitly be recognizing the perceived
shortcomings of the curative doctrines. Accordingly, there is not
only jurisprudential confusion as to the proper standard, but there is
also jurisprudential ambiguity as to what constitutes a formally
compliant will and what does not. The result appears to be that strict
compliance maintains a prevalent role in Louisiana law.
IV. THE GUEZURAGA TEST AS A UNIQUE CURATIVE APPROACH
Louisiana courts are left with few practical or desirable
solutions to cure the current ambiguity. The overwhelming
academic and jurisprudential sentiment indicates that the inequities
of strict compliance are unsustainable in modern succession law.
Although both substantial compliance and harmless error, when
applied according to the scholarly articulation, may potentially
achieve a more equitable result than strict compliance, neither has
had much success as applied in other states.198 Thus, neither
substantial compliance nor harmless error presents an ideal solution.
Consequently, this Comment argues for a continuing application of
the Guezuraga standard, supplying Louisiana courts with a curative
doctrine uniquely distinct from those applied in other jurisdictions.
Moreover, this Comment provides guidance as to the proper
application of this standard.

preponderance of the evidence. In contrast to the quantitative or sufficiency notion
of substantial compliance sometimes applied in the courts, application of the
functional substantial compliance doctrine does not depend on the court's
determining that the conduct of the testator or witnesses was sufficiently close to
the statutory standard to be deemed in actual compliance with the wills act.”).
197. Id. at 302–11.
198. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the lack of success of the curative
doctrines).
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A. The Guezuraga Test
In light of the limitations of the historical approaches, this
Comment advocates for courts to maintain the Guezuraga
standard: if the formalities present in a document, taking all formal
deviations into consideration, sufficiently protect the testator
against the probability of fraud, the will remains valid.199 Like the
underlying purposes of substantial compliance, the functions of
testamentary formalities remain properly preserved under this
doctrine. However, the Guezuraga standard is distinct from the
substantial compliance doctrine as understood by Langbein.200
Perhaps one source of confusion in Louisiana is that referring to
Guezuraga as a substantial compliance case is a misnomer. First,
the scholarly understanding of substantial compliance is that courts
must apply a functional analysis.201 Guezuraga, on the other hand,
requires courts to look only to the likelihood of fraud, taking into
account only one of the functions of statutory formalities: the
protective function.202 Second, the name substantial compliance
leads courts to believe that the doctrine requires a quantitative, as
opposed to a contextual, analysis.203 Thus, this Comment rejects
the continued use of referring to the Guezuraga standard as
“substantial compliance” and chooses instead to refer to the
standard simply as the “Guezuraga test.”
The Guezuraga test, as articulated, essentially serves a similar
role as the harmless error rule by providing a simplified version of
substantial compliance. The goal of the Guezuraga test—to guard
against fraud—provides the same function as that underlying
harmless error: the protection of testamentary intent. Of the four
functions of testamentary formalities, the protective function is the
function most directly tied to testamentary intent. In other words,
evidence of fraud or undue influence indicates that the testator did
not truly intend for the document to be his or her will. The test’s
advantage over harmless error is that its analysis is more targeted
199. Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987).
200. Langbein believed that every function of will formalities should be
considered when analyzing defective wills. Langbein, supra note 7, at 513 (“The
substantial compliance doctrine would permit the proponents in cases of
defective execution to prove what they are now entitled to presume from due
execution—the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment of the
[statutory functions].”). Guezuraga provides that wills should be validated only
after analyzing the defect against the protective function. See Guezuraga, 512
So. 2d at 368.
201. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 523.
202. See Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368.
203. See Miller, supra note 26, at 306–08.
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and simplified: instead of looking to evidence of intent, courts look
to the potential for fraud. Courts are also likely to be more suited
for analyzing the potential for fraud than for determining
testamentary intent, thus fulfilling the channeling function more
effectively than the other curative doctrines.
Maintaining the Guezuraga test achieves the goals of the
curative doctrines and requires no change in the law. The doctrine
adequately serves the four functions of testamentary formalities.
The protective function is best served by courts looking to the
likelihood of fraud in the testament’s formalities. The channeling
function is more effective than in substantial compliance or
harmless error: courts are better equipped to make determinations
of fraud rather than conduct analyses of testamentary functions,
thereby streamlining the judicial process. The cautionary and
evidentiary functions are unaffected by the Guezuraga test because
the formalities themselves remain unchanged. Certainly, this
approach is both equitable and practical. Moreover, the doctrine is
entirely unique in United States succession law, providing
Louisiana courts an opportunity to implement an entirely new
curative doctrine that may well prove to be far more successful
than those employed by other states.
However, the Guezuraga test, as currently applied by Louisiana
courts, appears to be more comparable to strict compliance.204
Accordingly, courts should utilize a functional framework as
opposed to a quantitative standard. Instead of asking whether a
deviation is “material” or establishing rules through precedent to
determine the validity of a document, courts must look instead to see
if a will’s formalities, taken as a whole, adequately guarded the
testator against the prospect of fraud. This must be done on a
contextual, case-by-case basis. Certainly, the more insignificant the
formal deviation is, the greater the likelihood the testament’s
formalities protected the testator from fraud. On the other hand, if
the deviation is great, the more likely it is that the testament is
fraudulent.205
B. The Advantages of the Guezuraga Test
A question remains as to whether the Guezuraga test should
analyze each formal deviation against the occurrence of actual
204. For discussion of Guezuraga’s inconsistent applications, see supra Part
III.
205. See, e.g., Succession of Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
Succession of Bilyeu appears to be the closest that a court has come to applying
the standard advocated by this Comment.
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fraud or, alternatively, the likelihood of fraud. The purpose of the
protective function, the function best served by the Guezuraga test,
is to ensure that the contents and execution of the will are the
products of the testator’s free choice.206 Requiring evidence of
actual fraud places a strong burden on the challenger to the
testament and also undermines the purposes of the formalities. For
example, every time a testator’s signature is omitted from the
testament, the only means of invalidating the will would be to
produce evidence that the signature was missing due to actual
fraud or undue influence, thus negating the effectiveness of the
signature requirement. The testator cannot be adequately protected
under this standard. Furthermore, the Court in Guezuraga
supported analyzing each document against the mere probability of
fraud: “If [the deviations] indicate an increased likelihood that
fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered
substantial and thus a cause to nullify the will.”207 By looking to
the likelihood of fraud, the functions of the formalities are
protected and the Guezuraga test remains a relaxed and contextual
standard.
At first glance, the likelihood-of-fraud standard might appear
to be quantitative; a missing signature of the testator will almost
always carry with it the probability of fraud or undue influence.
Nevertheless, likelihood of fraud does not necessarily create a
blanket rule akin to strict compliance. If other evidence indicates
that the lack of a signature was not the product of fraud and that
the document accurately reflected the intent of the testator, the
testament can still be validated. However, some Louisiana courts
have precluded the introduction of testimony or affidavits of the
notary or witnesses to “cure” an attestation clause that does not
comport with the statutory requirements.208 Excluding such
206. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.
207. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368 (citing Loretta Garvey Whyte, Note,
Donations—Imperfect Compliance With the Formal Requirements of the
Statutory Will, 15 LOY. L. REV. 362, 371 (1969)). See also Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d at
59 (“If there exists an indication of the increased likelihood of fraud, the
variations would be considered substantial and thus a cause to nullify a will. If
not, they should be disregarded.”).
208. See, e.g., Succession of English, 508 So. 2d 631, 633 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (“The affidavit used to probate the will cannot ‘cure’ the total lack of an
attestation clause. Such an interpretation would render meaningless the
mandatory requirements of the statute and do violence to the jurisprudentially
recognized purpose of the attestation clause.”); In re Succession of Richardson,
934 So. 2d 749, 752 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“We further conclude that, unfair as it
seems, there is no procedure that would allow the witnesses to testify as to the
validity of the will.”); In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1189 (La.
Ct. App. 2013) (“Although Mrs. Holbrook attempted to remedy this defect in the
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evidence is inequitable and inconsistent with Guezuraga and should
not be followed. To disregard the testimony of the notary or
witnesses renders their roles in the execution ceremony somewhat
useless considering one of the purposes of testamentary formalities
is to serve an evidentiary function.209 Consequently, Louisiana
courts should abandon the rule that some courts have utilized that
precludes admission of witness testimony or affidavits in support of
a will invalidated for lack of compliance with all form requirements.
C. The Guezuraga Test in Application
To provide an example of the proposed analysis in practice,
consider the facts of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent holding
in In re Succession of Holbrook.210 The will was properly signed
and witnessed by the appropriate parties.211 On the attestation
clause of Mr. Holbrook’s will, the notary neglected to place the
day, the 8th, next to the month and year, April 2009.212 Standing
alone, with no other statutory deviations, the omission provides little
evidence that the testament was likely the product of fraud or undue
influence. The date would be relevant if the opponent of the will
sought to introduce another testament written in the same month and
year as the contested will. Here, though, the only document
available for probate was the disputed will.213 Furthermore, the
proponent of the will’s validity, the decedent’s widow, attempted to
introduce affidavits supplying the testimony of the notary and one of
the witnesses to demonstrate that the will had been properly
executed.214 Moreover, every other page on the document
contained the full date.215 Such evidence, combined with the minor
nature of the defect, would indicate the likelihood of fraud to be

attestation clause by submitting affidavits stating that Mr. Holbrook executed his
will before the notary and two witnesses on April 8, 2009, and that the ‘8’ in the
date of the attestation clause was inadvertently omitted, additional evidence on
this issue is precluded.”), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014); In re Succession of
Seal, No. 2010-CA-0351, 2010 WL 3527597, at *4 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 10,
2010) (“Further, such defects constitute a substantive defect fatal to the validity
of the will and cannot be cured through the subsequent testimony of the
witnesses and the notary.”).
209. Glover, supra note 14, at 23.
210. In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).
211. Id. at 846–47.
212. Id. at 848.
213. The court makes no mention of an alternative testament. Id.
214. Id. at 847.
215. Id. at 848.
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minimal in Mr. Holbrook’s case. Hence, under the Guezuraga test,
a court would likely validate the will under such circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The struggle that Louisiana courts face with respect to will
formalities transcends many jurisdictions throughout the United
States. The effort to reform the law of will execution as a means to
protect testamentary intent has been laudable, albeit flawed. This
area of the law is still evolving; until courts apply one of the
remedial doctrines with success, uncertainty will continue. This
Comment contends that courts and scholars should recognize a
new approach: the Guezuraga test. If the document, with all formal
requirements and evidence taken into consideration, reflects that
the testator was adequately protected against the likelihood of
fraud, the will should be considered valid. If the formal deviation
increases the probability that the document is fraudulent, the will is
null. By applying a likelihood-of-fraud analysis, Louisiana courts
have the opportunity to pioneer in this area of the law by validating
formally defective wills with logic and consistency through a
unique approach utilized by no other jurisdiction in this country.
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